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Background to the conflict 
Even casual observers  of the Myanmar political scene will be aware that one of the most 
difficult and enduring problems that continues to challenge the country’s political transition is 
the need to find a resolution to the manifold conflicts that have taken place in the so-called 
‘ethnic’ states.1 One of the longest of these conflicts has been in the Kachin State, in the north 
of the country. The Kachin Independence Army was founded in 1961 and entered into armed 
conflict with the central military regime following General Ne Win’s takeover of power in 
1962. Although there were some attempts to broker ceasefires during the following decades, 
the fighting continued more or less without cessation until 1994, when an agreement to retain 
arms but refrain from violence was eventually signed. In June 2011, this ceasefire in turn 
collapsed after being in place for seventeen years and the conflict has since then remained 
stubbornly impervious to resolution. It is proving as difficult as ever it was in the past to find 
a way forward through negotiation, and the national peace process, centred upon the 
conclusion of a nationwide ceasefire with all principal ethnic armed groups as promoted by 
the national government, is floundering once more.
2
 
It is a convention in almost any policy document or analysis of the Kachin conflict to 
begin with a longer history of the Kachin region, often invoking, too, a pseudo-
anthropological interpretation of kinship and lineage as perennial markers of ‘Kachin’ 
identity and a means of explaining the nature of this enduring resistance. Typically, too, such 
analysis will describe the Kachin experience under colonial rule as a decisive factor in 
explaining the continuation of problems down to the present. This includes the political 
separation of the Frontier Areas from the rest, the military privileging of ethnic recruits into 
the colonial army and then the failure and ongoing symbolism of the Panglong Agreement of 
1947.
3
 The agreement was signed by General Aung San and a number of elite representatives 
of ‘ethnic minority’ communities with the intention of facilitating the speedy withdrawal of 
British imperial power on the basis of a future commitment by the Burmese nationalist 
government to introducing a federal system.
4
 This over-arching historical narrative, which is 
used to explain the emergence and rationale of the Kachin conflict down to the present, is so 
well-rehearsed that it has become almost impossible to resist.  
Yet there is a case for saying that the continued repetition of the same historical 
narrative to explain the Kachin conflict, and others, has served mainly to naturalise, even to 
normalise the prevalence of conflict in this region.  As a result, more penetrating analysis of 
the present re-emergence of conflict in the Kachin region is often lacking because the causes 
are already felt to be known and understood. One outcome of this tendency to normalise 
conflict rather than subject its longevity and resilience to a careful critical questioning is that 
there is a tendency also to believe that it will only be fully resolved when there is capitulation 
of the weaker to the stronger political impetus, of the ‘traditional’ to the ‘modern’ – in this 
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case, the innate drive of the unitary state must inevitably win out over that of the federal with 
its implicit attachments to perennial loyalties.
5
 The sense of frustration with ‘the Kachin’ is 
palpable among those Myanmar and foreign policy makers and observers who seem mainly 
to wish that they would stop fighting a battle that they are bound to lose and which they 
consider currently as producing a great impediment to political progress nationally. From the 
perspective of central government concerns, this seems to be a not unreasonable line of 
analysis. However, if we are to understand why in 2014 we are in many respects as far from 
an agreement to end the conflict than we were in 2013, closer attention needs to be paid to 
understanding a more contemporary history rather than relying on convention within a 
narrative about a more distant past. While this longer history is threaded through the present 
situation, not least in the symbolic justifications of resistance and in a prevailing social 
memory of injustices borne, developments since the signing of the ceasefire in 1994 also 
require our attention.
6
 These developments have created a newly politicised movement in 
urban areas of the Kachin region that have been vitally important in creating social support 
for the resumption of conflict, and which has gone a long way to reversing the decline of the 
KIA’s and KIO’s civil support base in the years between 1994 and 2008. These developments 
have brought in newly active nationalist inspired groups of young Kachin people, who have 
become energised in the cause of Kachin ethno-nationalism in a post-digital age. 
Understanding the dynamics of this rapidly changing Kachin society is as important for 
understanding the intransigent nature of the current conflict and the failure to bring resolution 
to it in 2014 as is that of the longer view. 
The signing and breaking of ceasefires 
The ceasefire between the KIA and the Tatmadaw in 1994 was one of many that were 
enabled from the late 1980s onwards between the Burma Army and the country’s many non-
national armed groups.
7
 The changing geo-politics of the region at this time helped the 
Myanmar military government to reposition itself favourably in relation to these 
developments. These changes in the wider political arena also made the conclusion of 
ceasefire agreements a more attractive proposition to many non-national armed groups than it 
had been previously. Two external factors were particularly important in this respect, and 
both seemed to weaken the position of ‘ethnic’ armed groups to resist pressures to conclude 
ceasefires.
8
 The first of these was the collapse of the Communist bloc, which saw also the 
collapse of the Communist Party of Burma or CPB. The CPB had long played a critical role 
in many of the conflict zones, especially along the eastern and north eastern borders of the 
country. The second factor was the changed orientation of Thailand and China in particular to 
negotiating with the Myanmar regime. Both nations increasingly sought to engage directly 
with the Myanmar government to build political relations and to facilitate access to natural 
resources within the country. Previously, their concerns had been more with local security 
control in border areas, which had been effected through relying on ethnic nationality and 
opposition groups in the borderlands to contain local conflict zones. Most non-national armed 
groups agreed to ceasefires following these changes, relinquishing some territory while 
keeping other areas ostensibly under their control. This was the pattern that also influenced 
the KIA in 1994 to conclude a ceasefire agreement. However, because the early ceasefires 
were arranged without clear agreements about how to implement a proper process of political 
reform beyond the cessation of violence, they amounted mainly just to the absence of fighting 
and not the establishment of genuine peace in many cases. The promise that political 
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discussions would follow in due course was taken largely in good faith and on the back of the 
weakened position of many groups to insist on this later process, as noted.
9
  
Yet this notwithstanding, many ceasefire groups, including the KIA/KIO, for their 
part agreed to halt armed conflict whilst having a range of objectives in mind of their own 
should the hoped for political progress not materialise, which was for many a highly probably 
outcome. For the KIA/KIO, the ceasefire also represented an opportunity to regroup after so 
many decades of conflict and to reconnect with the civilian populations from which they had 
become increasingly isolated. The nature of these conflicts, which saw the troops of non-
national armed groups ensconced in the hills and mountains away from the towns, meant that 
armed groups had become increasingly isolated over time from the civil and especially urban 
constituencies from whom they needed to draw support. Following the ceasefire, the KIO 
leadership hoped that they would be able to reconnect with Kachin people in areas from 
which the KIO and KIA had been excluded for many years. These concerns about rebuilding 
the social, political and economic base of their movement also influenced their desire to 
conclude a ceasefire for some of the Kachin politico-military elites responsible for making 
the critical decision.
10
 
The Kachin ceasefire was considered at the time something of a coup for the national 
military regime. It was hoped that the Kachin agreement would become an example for how 
armed militias could be brought back within the national fold and ‘tamed’ towards a common 
political purpose of national unitary government. From the outset, therefore, the intentions 
and perspectives of what the ceasefire might bring for both sides were at best uncertain and 
taken on trust and at worst, potentially highly contradictory between the various signatories. 
The key issue, however, was that the agreements were made without any clear political 
framework for developing lines of further communication around substantive issues of 
political grievance. 
The local developments leading to the collapse of the ceasefire in June 2011 have 
been fairly well documented.
11
 The breakdown centred upon government attacks upon KIA 
troops close to the Ta-pein hydropower plant and subsequent retaliations by the KIA, with 
progressive escalation of attacks on both sides through the summer of 2011. However, the 
lead time to the breakdown was much longer than this local problem in June 2011 suggests. 
Indeed, the fact that the conflict was sparked in territory adjacent to a Chinese-owned hydro-
power plant also reflects that developments during the ceasefire had created a range of new 
issues in the region that influenced local perceptions of the ceasefire and its outcomes.
12
 The 
response to these, not least of which was a perception of the progressive exclusion of local to 
foreign economic interests in the exploitation of the region’s natural resources, continued to 
undermine the notion that the ceasefire and current processes of political reform were capable 
of delivering substantive, positive economic and political change.  
By 2011, the Myanmar state was probably stronger than it had ever been due to the 
economic gains it had made through oil and gas and other natural resource exploitation.
13
 It 
was also bolstered by increasing engagement with the international community following the 
re-emergence of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi into national political life. Initially, all opposition 
forces raised questions about the future direction of political progress, given the continued 
strengthening of Myanmar armed forces and the extension of state and military influence in 
the Kachin region and elsewhere. When combined with the limited capacity of the political 
reforms to remove the dominance of the military, there was some credence to the accusation 
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that foreign governments had perhaps responded too enthusiastically to what were, in 
essence, quite limited signs of real change. The lack of attention to ethnic nationality 
concerns by these foreign powers, at least initially, may even inadvertently have weakened 
the capacity of ethnic interest groups to have their concerns addressed. Not least of these 
concerns was whether the constitutional mechanisms in place to defend against future 
institutional violence were genuine and viable. While even Burmese opposition politicians 
raised concerns about many problematic features embedded in the constitutional proposals, a 
primary concern especially for non-Burman political interest groups, who felt that control 
over their economic resource base was slipping out of their hands, was intense uncertainty 
about how much reform would be allowed by a government and political system that 
continued to be dominated by the Myanmar armed forces.  
 
The inevitable conclusion many drew from this situation was that the new arrangements 
being proposed for a national ceasefire and the reconfiguration of large non-national armies 
as small Border Guard Forces were not focused enough towards ‘genuine peace’: they aimed 
mainly at  the cessation of fighting rather than being directed towards substantive forward 
movement politically. By June 2011, therefore, the decision to continue with the escalation of 
conflict rather than withdraw and pursue its containment reflected very strongly that the 
cessation of fighting during the 1990s was now understood as being a juncture that had 
allowed the Myanmar Army to penetrate new areas that had previously resisted that 
penetration, while also enabling them to engage in the preferential exploitation of natural 
resources, which is often referred to as a process of ‘ceasefire capitalism’.14 
 
These developments, however, also created new forms of social opposition prior to June 
2011. This is reflected across the country in protests objecting to hydroelectric dam projects, 
for example. Protests over copper mines and the Myitsone dam as seen in the years building 
up to the collapse of the ceasefire reflected underlying and significant processes of social 
transformation that were felt in urban areas of Kachin state as much as in central Myanmar.
15
 
This has resulted in a newly politicised social domain within Kachin society in recent years, 
especially among urban youth and diaspora Kachin groups, that draws on new forms of 
communication and has sharpened expectations in relation to the nature of political progress 
that they are prepared to consider ‘genuine’. These developments have created new 
challenges for elite leadership of the Kachin nationalist movement, too. They have also had to 
modify their modes of interaction with the political-civil constituency of modern, urban 
Kachin society to reflect this more broad ranging politicisation. In this respect, the desire to 
use the ceasefire of 1994 to build a strong civil political culture had clearly been realised, 
although perhaps not entirely in ways that were anticipated by the nationalist leadership who 
concluded the ceasefire in 1994.  
The experience of the ceasefire 1994-2011, therefore, has many ways become a 
marker of the antithesis of real political progress, instead being taken now as an experience 
that highlights the limitations of engaging in such agreements unless the political terrain is 
made more stable. This has, again, progressively made a return to a ceasefire agreement 
harder to implement, even though 2013 seemed to suggest that there was forward movement 
in this regard.
16
 These newly politicised demographic groups were able to ally themselves 
increasingly to more focused demands from within the KIA/KIO leadership following 2011 
that an end to the present conflict could not, this time, be a matter of hope over experience: 
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agreements would have to be managed and responded to on a political level if ‘genuine’ 
peace was to be achieved. It is this internal dynamic within Kachin society that has also made 
the resolution of conflict throughout 2014 more difficult to facilitate given the way in which 
support for continuing the conflict has coalesced.
17
 
Ending the year on a low note? 
It would be preferable to begin a review of events relating to the ongoing conflict in the 
Kachin State during 2014 with a statement that some of the optimism that had been 
demonstrated at the end of 2013 had continued to bear fruit. Since the violence of June 2011, 
there had been numerous low level incidents but there were also repeated efforts to try to find 
a basis upon which substantive discussions could take place to halt the fighting. 2013 ended 
on a somewhat optimistic note in this respect and things boded well for events in 2014 to be 
more positive.  
The tensions that were starting to build between those groups who were now engaged 
in recent ceasefire agreements and those who were not were one major issue of concern for 
KIA/KIO elites. 2013 ended with a significant meeting taking place in Laiza, the border town 
which some refer to as ‘the real Kachin capital’, between leaders of many ethnic armed 
groups facilitated by the KIA. The meeting hoped to develop a coherent multi-group strategy 
that would prevent too great a divide being created between current ceasefire and non-
ceasefire groups. This reflected some challenge to the government’s push towards a national 
ceasefire, which many observers now felt was to be an almost inevitable outcome of the 
current political trajectory. The light that the continuing conflict shone on government 
attitudes to genuine reform towards greater autonomy of ‘ethnic’ states within a unified 
Myanmar in many ways began to empower the KIA/KIO at this time, enabling them to 
progress their desire to build coalitions with other groups to counteract the fragmentation that 
the recent ceasefires and peace negotiations seemed to generate. The KIA/KIO has long been 
at the forefront of such strategies of multi-group co-operation,
18
 and it maps also onto internal 
models of allegiance building that have, overall, served the Kachin ethno-nationalist cause 
well.
19
  In October 2013, therefore, the ‘ethnic’ conference in Laiza saw a wide range of 
groups with ethnic nationality allegiances meet to discuss how to develop a more united 
strategy. The absence of such a strategy has long been the stumbling block of ethnic 
resistance, as well as being a cause of frustration for those who might wish to support them. 
Clarifying the diverse agendas and orientations of multiple groups locked in what might 
appear superficially to be highly local interests has been a persistent challenge. The 18 groups 
who attended preliminary discussions at Laiza also wanted to put forward an alternative to 
the national ceasefire proposals that had been promoted by the government and in different 
form by the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC)
20
 and Working Group on Ethnic 
Coordination (WGEC) respectively. The alternative they tried to develop focused on the 
higher political objectives desired by these long-term resistance movements: the need for 
substantive political dialogue and changes to the constitution to ensure democratic 
governance, as well as respect for claims for greater autonomy and the higher values of 
human rights. Despite the fundamental and huge differences in the pathways to national 
ceasefire that these various documents proposed, the difficulty in the detail was considered by 
some observers, who longed for the blocks to a national ceasefire to be removed, as largely a 
circumstantial issue of lesser importance than the fact that some negotiations or discussions 
were being resumed. This is what made the development seem hopeful at the end of 2013.   
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Following the ethnic conference, the government peace negotiating team met with the 
KIA/KIO. The delegation was led by U Aung Min and his expressed intention was to pursue 
a political process through an agreed framework. Monthly meetings were then held between a 
KIO Technical Advisory Team and government representatives to develop constructive lines 
of engagement. The United Nations Special Adviser on Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar also 
expressed his hope and expectation that a breakthrough might be found. In short, at the end of 
2013 it was felt by many observers and analysts that a national ceasefire was still a viable 
outcome during the next few months and that resist or not, the Kachin politico-military elites 
would be drawn into this process almost as an inevitability. 
Yet there was a counter-analysis to this optimism from the start. On the Kachin side, 
the Myitkyina meetings saw a massive local outpouring of support for the KIA leadership as 
they rode in convoy through the town to discuss the pathways to agreement.
21
 This local 
outpouring reflected the widespread anger at the displacement of many thousands of people 
to border refugee camps over the previous two years. The United Nations estimates that as 
many as 100,000 civilians have been displaced during this time.
22
 The local sense is that there 
is disinterest in this human suffering among all political groups in mainstream political life 
and a general unwillingness to engage substantially with the political issues of concern in this 
region. Increasingly this has included a sense of distrust of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi herself, 
further widening the gulf between the local and the national.
23
 Yet the likelihood of success 
in the talks was diminished by the insistence by Lt Gen Myit Soe of the Ministry of Defence 
that ethnic groups would have to trust the government to act on their behalf. This has been the 
sticking point since the collapse of the quasi-federal state in Burma over decades: how can 
trust be built in the national political system when it seems to be enshrined in policies and 
practices determined to undermine the federal autonomy that so many see as a viable way 
ahead? Trust must surely be earned following so many years of mistrust is the not 
unreasonable retort; it is in this regard that the history of the recent ceasefire is so critical to 
understanding present difficulties. The Laiza agreement signed by seventeen of the eighteen 
ethnic armed group representatives present was a new testing ground for working out the 
orientation of political negotiations to follow in 2014. That it ultimately shone a light on the 
impossibility of moving forward negotiations along anything other than government-defined 
lines of least resistance led throughout 2014 to the gradual unravelling in this year of the 
national ceasefire accord as a whole.
24
 
The gulf between expectations that substantive talks about political change should 
form a basis for developing further talks has remained too difficult to bridge. Regrettably, 
therefore, as noted, 2014 has seen few positive developments towards ending the conflict in 
Kachin state. Indeed, in many respects, the two sides seem as far apart as ever. As 2014 has 
passed, the recurring violence between the KIA and the Tatmadaw has continued to influence 
perceptions that the desire of the civil-military Myanmar government to bring about true 
political transformation, which respected the interests of ‘ethnic’ communities, was less than 
genuine. Perhaps even more significantly, the ongoing antagonism created around the 
situation in the Kachin region seems now to be drawing into its orbit increasing numbers of 
representatives from other ethnic groups who were initially inclined favourably towards 
signing a national ceasefire agreement, making this cornerstone of the government’s peace 
plan seem more out of reach than ever it was at the end of 2013. The recurrent, low-level 
violence that continued to surface in many parts of the country throughout the year, including 
increasingly a return to low-level violence in the northern Shan states, has had a corrosive 
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effect upon attempts at trust-building.
25
 In addition, the ongoing actions of radical Burmese 
Buddhist groups and anti-Islamic violence has sharpened the sense among many of the 
country’s non-Burman communities that the same prejudices and chauvinism of Burmese 
nationalism that has long undermined attempts to have their grievances addressed at a 
national political level are simply being manifested in another way.
26
 The gap between many 
of the ethnic constituencies and the government seems to widen as time goes by and in the 
absence of substantial progress around key political issues and the roller coaster continues. 
2014, therefore, draws to a close on a sombre note that merely highlights the incredible 
difficulties that inhibit Myanmar as a whole moving towards a stable political future based on 
democratic institutions, which might be capable of resolving finally these entrenched 
hostilities.  
The year in Kachin State has drawn to a close marked by events on November 19
th
, 
when shells were fired by the Burma Army Light Infantry Battalion 390 from their position 
on Hka Ya Bum, a mountain just outside Laiza. Hka Ya Bum has particular relevance in local 
expressions of Kachin nationalist anger at recent events as it was taken by the Tatmadaw 
following a series of unprecedented airstrikes around Laiza at the end of 2012 and continuing 
into 2013.
27
 105mm Howitzer shells landed on the parade ground of the Officer Training 
School of the Kachin Independence Army, which is located on Woi Chyai Bum, another 
mountain close to the border town. Initial reports following the shelling of the Officer 
Training School stated that twenty three young officer cadets had been killed, many of whom 
were not Kachin but came from a number of different ethnic armed groups, while a similar 
number had been wounded. Unsurprisingly, the attacks were immediately followed by claims 
and counter claims from both sides: it was an ‘accident’ said a Burma Army spokesman 
initially;
28
 it was a deliberate provocation claimed the KIA; it was a ‘warning shot’ to force 
the KIA to cease from its attacks upon columns of the Burma Army patrolling nearby roads 
and routes.
29
 One thing that seems to have been generally agreed, however, was that the 
shelling was yet another blow to trust-building and to the peace talks that had failed to attain 
force through forward movement as part of the country’s reform programme following a year 
of skirmishes, attacks and low-level violence.
30
 
Yet shells continued to be fired from the Burma Army post over the following week, 
suggesting that ‘accident’ was certainly not a viable explanation of the initial action. Some of 
these shells landed perilously close to civilian areas and the tragic human settlements that 
have sprung up close to the border to house the many thousands of internally displaced 
people forced to flee their homes since the collapse of the ceasefire in June 2011. Indeed, 
incidents such as these have prompted even some of the most experienced, long-term analysts 
of the country’s ethnic politics, who are often highly sceptical of conspiracy theorists and 
projections of grand schemes of targeted persecution, to suspect that the Kachin movement 
may justifiably see itself as being subject to a special form of discrimination and punishment 
as a means of forcing it finally to buckle and become compliant with government demands in 
the absence of openings for imposing a ceasefire. In this respect, the use of air strikes upon 
KIA strongholds and close to the civilian areas of Laiza, as noted, which was a previously 
unseen strategy in Tatmadaw engagements with ethnic armed groups seems to ring true. 
For any outside observer who remains perplexed at the ongoing, apparently 
intransigent resistance of the KIO to acquiesce to pressures for a renewed ceasefire 
throughout 2014, the recent shelling of the Officer Training School raises more issues for 
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consideration than just than simply that of the pointlessness of the bloodshed, therefore. 
While the creation of the Officer Training School reflected outwardly the ongoing, 
entrenched militarised ethno-nationalism that had marked the post-colonial history of the 
Kachin State, the creation of the Training School in 2007 also reflected other issues. It 
represented the integration of yet another generation of young Kachin men into the formal 
military structures of the movement and a specifically contingent set of concerns around the 
pressures being placed on the KIA at that moment to disband and form a Border Guard Force 
and for its political representatives to blend themselves into the backdrop of political reforms 
around the National Convention and the Constitution. In this sense, it represented yet another 
new phase of developments and not just the repetitive cycling of perennial, even archaic 
ones.
31
 While these new orientations inevitably drew strength from a narrative of the past, the 
officer cadets were clearly a new demographic group choosing to sign up to a variety of 
armed groups that were concurrently being pressured to disarm.  
In April 2014 KIA Deputy Commander in Chief, General Gun Maw, visited the 
United States.
32
 Increasingly it seems clear that happens next to resolve the conflict in the 
region will be influenced significantly by international affairs, and most specifically by the 
degree to which China and the US use this region as a proxy or testing ground for their own 
regional rivalries.
33
 This wider geo-political rivalry may have unforeseen consequences as it 
is played out. However, the Chinese influence may be the one factor capable of promoting a 
renewed ceasefire in the short term, as authorities in China, who have also worked hard at 
building strong relations with the Jingpo national minority elites on the China side of the 
border, seem to be more interested in a cessation of violence than either, apparently, the 
Myanmar Army or the KIO/KIA. However, the particular cross-border concerns with China 
and issues of resource extraction and economic development in the region create an 
overarching, highly complex geo-political situation that is generally unstable and 
unpredictable. It is undoubtedly difficult for the KIO to manage these broader influences in 
their own interests, whatever their capacity to generate linkages across borderlines. The 
relationship with and involvement of China, therefore, remain critical in this process. While 
the Chinese authorities do not actively support the KIO, neither do they entirely trust the 
Myanmar government, who many in China see as unreliable.
34
 At the same time as top-level 
meetings between Burmese and Chinese officials have been taking place, therefore, increased 
unofficial engagements between the KIO and authorities in China have also been seen. The 
Kachin politico-military elites have tried to take advantage of this in producing a language of 
negotiation, emphasising longer term historical connections between the region and China, 
through the jade trade for example. Some Kachin elites have tried to emphasise their closer 
ethnic/historical ties to the Han as opposed to the Burmese in this respect, as a means of 
negotiating preferential or sympathetic relations with local authorities in Yunnan. However, 
negotiation meetings have been challenging as the Kachin have also found the Chinese to be 
overbearing; some Chinese negotiators find the Kachin elites politically shrewd but lacking 
insight or power to negotiate a better deal for themselves, making the relationship between 
the two unstable and fraught as the stakes become higher for both sides. Chinese perceptions 
of the Burmese state are also marked by suspicion and there is a fear of contemporary 
Myanmar being ‘used’ by the USA. It seems clear to many observers, too, that the Myanmar 
state itself is not ready for big Chinese investment and the overt extension of their economic 
and political ambitions through the Kachin region which, again, may result in unintended or 
unanticipated consequences of a renewed ceasefire without solid foundations for political 
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progress. This is especially likely given the current emphasis on the cessation of fighting 
rather than substantive political forward movement. The lessons of the recent past are that 
this leads mainly to unfulfilled aspirations and an ever-sharpening sense of frustration with a 
possible descent to further forms of violence in the future. As the focus of attention at the end 
of 2014 now shifts to concerns about the general election in 2015, the terrain seems just as 
unstable. 
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